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Abstract
This study examines whether the corporate social performance (CSP) activities of firms influence the
structure of debt in the Australian context. Long-term debt is often associated with higher monitoring by
lenders, which suggests that firms may benefit from using long-term debt strategically. Short-term debt
arises from regular business dealings with a number of primary stakeholders such as customers, suppliers,
employees and lenders. We propose in this study that businesses that are committed to improving CSP
outcomes may reduce use of short-term debt contributing to building sustainable long-term relationships
with the primary stakeholders. We therefore investigate whether firms that prioritise CSP favour long-term
debt or short-term debt. Using a sample of Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed firms, this study
finds that the level of CSP is not associated with long-term debt use, but there is a significant negative
association between CSP and the short-term debt usage. This finding suggests that firms with stakeholderfriendly policies reduce their use of short-term debt rather than long-term debt. The reduced use of shortterm debt helps resolve possible conflicts between the primary stakeholders and a firm, thus this study
presents evidence supporting stakeholder theory and conflict-resolution hypothesis.

JEL classification: M14; G34; G32
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1. Introduction
The deliberations on the ethical, environmental and social dimensions of business activities ebbed
and flowed in business, academic and media circles for the past four decades (see for example,
Mintzberg, 1983, Carroll, 1999, Kolk, 2016). More recently, attention has turned to how
businesses address their responsibilities to all stakeholders instead of only the shareholders. The
UN Global Compact, for example, calls on companies around the world to ‘align strategies and
operations with universal principles of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption,
and take actions that advance societal goals’ (United Nations Global Compact, 2019). Similarly,
chief executive officers (CEOs) of nearly 200 large companies in the world redefined the purpose
of a corporation through a statement issued by the Business Roundtable in August 2019 (Business
Roundtable, 2019). This statement highlights the purpose of a corporation as ‘delivering value to
customers’, ‘investing in our employees’, ‘dealing fairly and ethically with our suppliers’,
‘supporting communities in which we work’ and ‘generating long-term value for shareholders’.
As a result of this broader focus on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of businesses, there
is a rapidly expanding literature related to measuring and reporting corporate social performance
(CSP) (Cai et al., 2016).
Many corporate collapses in Australia and elsewhere have left stakeholders bearing the financial
burden (Zona et al., 2013), thus highlighting the need for more research on the social performance
of corporations. Most of the earlier CSP empirical literature analyses the influence of CSP
activities on firms’ financial performance (see, for example, Beurden and Gössling, 2008, Lu et
al., 2014, Shahzad and Sharfman, 2015). Financial performance, however, is a broad measure of
various activities undertaken by firms which provides little information about specific impact of
CSP activities on each of the several dimensions. Our purpose is to investigate the impact of CSP
activities on a single dimension of corporate financial activities. While there is an extant literature
that indirectly suggests linkages between certain aspects of CSP and use of debt, this study
contributes to theory building and empirical validation of the association between a broader
measure of CSP and use of short-term and long-term debt.
Some of the earlier literature (Myers, 1977, Jensen, 1986, Titman and Wessels, 1988, Maksimovic
and Titman, 1991) examines the use of debt and stakeholder relationships. The stakeholder theory
of capital structure as proposed by Maksimovic and Titman (1991) suggests that customers,
suppliers, employees, and other stakeholders bear the costs of liquidation of firms. Corporate firms,
therefore, to encourage positive relationships with stakeholders, tend to employ lower debt levels.
Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010) find that firms that value employee well-being employ lower
levels of debt. Similarly, Bae et al. (2011) find that firms that are regarded as friendly to employees
use lower levels of debt. Both these studies employ varying measures of employee-friendliness
and different debt measures. While Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010) use total debt Bae et al.
(2011) consider long-term debt. The total debt includes both short-term and long-term debt. The
long-term debt is sourced from institutional investors as well as retail investors. The short-term
debt includes accounts payables or trade creditors, employee benefits, borrowings, derivative
financial liabilities, current tax payable and revenue received in advance. In other words, cash
flows associated with short-term debt are associated with a number of stakeholders including
suppliers, lenders, employees and customers. The interests of all these stakeholders may or may
not be aligned. It is therefore important to consider both the short-term debt as well as the longterm debt – i.e., the structure of debt. Similarly, a broader measure of corporate social performance
that includes consideration of interests of employees and other stakeholders is critical in capturing
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a holistic measure of corporate social activities. This study therefore extends research that links
employee-friendliness with use of debt to consideration of a broader measure of CSP and use of
both short-term and long-term debt. Unlike previous studies which focus on employees we
consider a broader measure of CSP that includes activities relating to customers, suppliers and the
community (primary stakeholders). This study therefore examines the use of debt by Australian
firms and the role played by CSP in determining such choice.
This study also aims to contribute to the CSP literature by focusing on the Australian context. The
Australian corporate sector and capital market are characterised by the presence of strong
institutions similar to that of the OECD countries. Employees in Australia are organized and often
belong to a trade union or an industry association and their compensation and work conditions are
determined largely through enterprise bargaining processes (Drago et al., 2007). Shareholders
associations in Australia play an important advocacy role with both retail and institutional
investors taking active interest in the annual general meetings (AGMs) of companies. These strong
institutions encourage companies to improve their social outcomes while at the same achieving
fair returns for both equity and debt investors. Given the enterprise bargain process in Australia,
employees are also catered for in terms of appropriate compensation and opportunities for training
and enhancing human capital which would benefit employees by helping them achieve career
progression as well as helping companies derive benefits from higher employee motivation and
productivity. We therefore investigate whether firms that prioritise CSP favour long-term debt or
short-term debt or both.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: In the next section relevant literature is
reviewed and the theoretical framework of this study is highlighted. A description of the empirical
analysis undertaken along with a discussion of the findings of the study are presented in the
penultimate section. The final section draws conclusions.
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
The use of the term CSP can be traced back to the mid-1970s (Sethi, 1975, Wartick and Cochran,
1985, Carroll, 1999). Wood (1991, p. 693) defined CSP as ‘a business organization’s configuration
of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs
and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm’s societal relationships’. Marom (2006) defined
CSP as the way businesses interpret and put CSR into practice. According to Beurden and Gössling
(2008), CSP assesses companies’ ‘general stance with respect to a complex range of concerns
relevant to the social field’ (p. 409). For Shahzad et al. (2015), CSP is concerned with the outcomes
of activities undertaken to fulfil a corporation’s CSR and it is the corporate governance
mechanisms within the firm that assist managers in finding the appropriate balance between the
claims of shareholders and other stakeholders. Gond and Crane (2010) take stock of the theoretical
developments and empirical research on CSP and point out that as a broad or universal construct,
CSP still lacks ‘strong theoretical foundations and empirical validity’ (p. 1). They also suggest that
a way forward is to acknowledge the non-testability of the universal construct and ‘move to an
approach that incorporates more inductive elements - that is, where empirical work is actively
incorporated into concept development and where theory is also built from data and not in
insolation from it’ (p. 18). This research is based on an inductive approach and contributes to
empirical literature related to CSP by focusing on activities that companies engage in to achieve
outcomes relating to CSP.
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2.1 CSR and financial performance
A vast amount of prior literature analyses the relationship between CSR and firm performance
(Scholtens, 2007, Jo and Harjoto, 2011, Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). The motivations for firms
to undertake CSR activities are considered in several studies. Harjoto and Jo (2011), for example,
identify four reasons commonly identified that relate to reputation building, a strategic choice that
leads to reduced probability of CEO turnover, signalling the quality of the firm through CSR
activities and to reduce the conflicts of interest between ‘non-investing stakeholders’ and
managers. However, in their large sample of US firms for the period 1993 to 2004, these
researchers only found strong evidence to support the conflict-resolution hypothesis. In their
review of 34 publications related to the benefits of CSP covering the period 1990 to 2007, Beurden
and Gössling (2008) concluded there is clear evidence that there is a positive correlation between
CSP and corporate financial performance. (Lee et al., 2009) find that corporate social performance
and financial performance have a negative relationship when stock returns are employed as a proxy
for financial performance. Mattingly (2015) summarised the results of over 100 studies that
employ Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) social ratings data and noted the differences in the
empirical results of the relationship between accounting and stock market measures of financial
performance and corporate social performance. Mattingly concludes that most of the studies that
employ accounting measures of performance show evidence of positive relationship between
corporate social performance and financial performance while this was not supported by studies
employing stock returns.
In related research, Rees and Rodionova (2015) find that governance arrangements perform a
mediating role on the relationship between ownership and environmental and social performance
of a large sample of firms from 46 countries for the period 2002 to 2012. When controlled for
governance they find that family ownership has a significant negative influence on environmental
and social performance in economies with dominant stock markets and strong focus on
shareholders and managers. Different types of ownership may have varying moderating influence
on the relationship between CSR and performance. For a sample of European firms from 16
countries, Dam and Scholtens (2012) find that ownership by individuals, employees and
corporations have a negative influence on performance while ownership by banks and institutional
investors and governments have no influence on the performance in 2005. Similarly, Ntim and
Soobaroyen (2013) find that CSR practices in combination with improved corporate governance
have a more pronounced positive effect on financial performance compared to stand alone
improvements in CSR practices for a sample of 291 non-financial firms listed on the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange for the period 2002 to 2009.
Previous studies in the Australian context examine certain dimensions of CSR. (Moroney et al.,
2012) analyses the role of assurance in improving the quality of environmental disclosure in a
sample of 74 Australian companies for the period 2003 to 2007. Young and Marais (2012) find
that the CSR reporting practices of Australian firms are relatively weaker compared to firms in
France and that the CSR reporting in high-risk industries is generally extensive compared to lowrisk industries. Jones et al. (2007) consider the role of CSR on labour policies of two mining firms
in Australia and point out the lack of evidence that implementing a CSR strategy results in a
fundamental change in the management of employment relations. Galbreath (2016) finds that CSR
is positively associated with the financial performance of a sample of Australian firms for the year
2004-2005.

7

AABFJ | Volume 15, No.4, 2021

Very few studies, Australian or international, focus on the relationship between CSP and use of
debt.
2.2 CSP and use of debt
The extant literature exploring factors that explain corporate use of debt does not specifically
explore the relationships between CSP and debt. Starting with the seminal works of Modigliani
and Miller (1958), Myers (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), Jensen (1986), several studies examine
the role of capital structure or the extent of debt on the value of firms. The relationship between
capital structure and stakeholder relationships was the focus of some of these studies (see for
example, Myers, 1977, Jensen, 1986, Titman and Wessels, 1988, Maksimovic and Titman, 1991).
Employees in particular, have a substantial and often non-diversified investment of human capital
when working for a firm. Employees are likely to lose not only income but also non-pecuniary
benefits when firms that they work for are liquidated (Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010). Similarly,
Jacobson et al. (1993) find that bankruptcy leads to loss of income and ‘firm-specific human
capital’ for employees and that workers in distressed firms start facing the consequences even prior
to liquidation. Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010) find that firms that ranked high in terms of
employee well-being operate at lower levels of debt. They also find that firms that rank highly on
employee well-being have higher credit ratings even after controlling for levels of debt. Bae et al.
(2011) synthesize the relationships between employee-friendliness and debt usage. They identify
three strands of literature. First, the stakeholder theory of capital structure choice as proposed by
Maksimovic and Titman (1991) suggests that employees, suppliers and other stakeholders bear
both direct and indirect costs of liquidation of firms and therefore as a way to encourage investment
in relationships by stakeholders, firms may employ lower debt levels. Second, the theory of agency
costs of debt and capital structure as proposed by Myers (1977) introduces the idea of
underinvestment. Firms may forego profitable investments when the payoffs from the new
investments afford more benefits to certain stakeholders. For instance, investment in employee
training and development may add long-term value to the firm, but firms may underinvest in these
projects when the benefits are perceived to be accruing more to employees than to the firms. Third,
the overinvestment problem of capital structure as proposed by Jensen (1986) suggests that firms
with an excess free cash flow may undertake more investments in employee related projects even
though these projects have negative net present values.
2.3 CSP and cost of debt
Another closely related strand of literature considers the influence of CSR and CSP on cost of
capital (see for example, Sharfman and Fernando, 2008, El Ghoul et al., 2011, Ye and Zhang,
2011, Chava, 2014). Firms that perform well in relation to CSR or CSP pose a lower risk and
investors are therefore willing to accept lower returns on such investments leading to a reduced
cost of capital for firms. Sharfman and Fernando (2008) show a reduction in the cost of capital for
a sample of US firms that improved their environmental risk management. The reduced cost of
capital allows firms to replace some equity financing with additional debt and realize tax benefits
for the firm and its investors. However, the relationship between CSR and cost of capital is not
always direct. Firms may have an optimal CSR investment level and when the actual CSR
investment is lower than this optimal level, the cost of debt capital may be lower. When CSR
investment exceeds the optimal level, the cost of capital may increase. Ye and Zhang (2011) show
evidence of a non-linear relationship between CSR investment and cost of debt capital for a sample
of Chinese firms. Their findings suggest that CSR investments may not always lead to substitution
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of equity with debt financing. The study by El Ghoul et al. (2011) finds a reduction in cost of
equity capital for a sample of US firms with better CSR scores. These findings suggest that a
reduction in the cost of equity capital makes debt financing less attractive.
2.4 CSP and use of debt – hypotheses development
Figure 1 traces the possible associations between CSP and debt. Long-term debt capital is secured
from both institutional and retail lenders even though in the Australian context, there is very little
retail debt issued by businesses through issue of corporate bonds. Long-term lenders face risks of
changes in credit quality that arises due to business-specific changes as well as macroeconomic
changes. Short-term debt relates to day-to-day activities of businesses. It includes accounts
payables or trade creditors, employee benefits, borrowings, derivative financial liabilities, current
tax payable and revenue received in advance. A number of primary stakeholders including
suppliers, lenders, employees and customers are associated with short-term debt. Agency theory
(Jensen, 1986) and conflict resolution hypotheses (Jensen, 2001, Jensen, 2002, Scherer et al., 2006,
Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010) highlight the possible conflicts of interest between these
stakeholders and shareholders. In addition to these two theories, the stakeholder theory
(Maksimovic and Titman, 1991, Bae et al., 2011) highlights the need for aligning interests and
pursue common goals including social responsibility imperatives. Employees, suppliers and other
stakeholders face both direct and indirect costs of liquidation of firms. The stakeholder theory
(Maksimovic and Titman, 1991) proposes that firms employ lower debt levels in order to develop
trust and long-term sustainable relationships with stakeholders.
Businesses undertake CSP activities with an aim to develop ‘trust and loyalty’ in their relationships
with employees, customers, suppliers and the community in which they operate. CSP activities
include product responsibility, and health and safety of customers; trust and commitment in
dealings with suppliers including investments in building sustainable supply chains; occupational
health and safety, and training and development of employees including employees working in
value chains; and community welfare and development including all forms of diversity, equal
opportunity, and human rights. CSP activities therefore address some of the concerns relating to
conflict of interests between shareholders and stakeholders including lenders.
Given the differences in stakeholders associated with the short-term and long-term debt, it is
imperative to consider possible associations between CSP and short-term debt and CSP and longterm debt. As considered previously, short-term debt arises from regular business dealings with a
number of primary stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, employees and lenders. Short-term
debt as described earlier consists of trade and other payables, employee benefits, borrowings,
derivative financial liabilities, current tax payable and revenue received in advance. Some of these
sources have a direct interest cost while others represent costs of doing business. Corporate firms
have choices in regards to their dealings with suppliers of short-term credit as well as other
stakeholders who provide goods or services. We propose that firms that improve their social
performance derive the twin benefits of improved and sustainable long-term relationships with the
primary stakeholders as well as efficiencies arising out of trust and closer relationships with
suppliers and other stakeholders. In addition, firms derive the benefits of improved productivity as
a result of the investments that they make in employee training and development as well as general
employee and community welfare. Extant literature in Australia and overseas supports the positive
benefits of employee training on improving productivity and accruing gains both to employees and
the firms (Black and Lynch, 1996, Blandy et al., 2000, Ballot et al., 2006). In the Australian
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context, there is a strong role for employee unions in determining work conditions resulting in
investments in employee development which further lead to improved efficiencies. Improved
employee productivity and efficiency makes it possible for firms to achieve efficiencies in working
capital management and therefore firms that have better CSP investments may reduce short-term
debt. This study therefore hypothesizes that CSP has a significant negative association with the
use of short-term debt of Australian firms as shown by the solid line in Figure 1. We therefore test
the following null hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: There is no association between CSP and short-term debt.
A negative association between CSP and short-term debt supports both the stakeholder theory
and the conflict resolution hypothesis.
The theory of agency costs of debt and capital structure as proposed by Myers (1977) introduces
the idea of underinvestment. Firms may forego profitable investments when the payoffs from the
new investments afford more benefits to certain stakeholders such as employees and lenders. For
instance, investment in employee training and development may add long-term value to the firm,
but firms may underinvest in these projects when the benefits are perceived to be accruing more
to employees than to the firms. Similarly firms may forego positive net present value investment
opportunities when the cash flows generated are used predominantly to service lenders interest and
principal repayments. In these situations, employees and lenders confront similar cash flow
uncertainties. The overinvestment problem of capital structure as proposed by Jensen (1986)
suggests that firms with an excess free cash flow may undertake more investments in employee
related projects even though these projects have negative net present values. D’Mello and Miranda
(2010) provide empirical evidence that increased debt reduces overinvestment problem in
businesses. Long-term debt is associated with higher disciplinary benefits (Jensen, 1986), which
suggests that firms may benefit from using long-term debt strategically. Businesses may increase
long-term debt as a means to have a better bargaining position with employees (Bronars and Deere,
1991). Similarly, businesses may hold high proportions of debt when faced with customers and
suppliers who are large and have a higher bargaining power (Kale and Shahrur, 2007). In summary,
long-term debt is associated with issues of underinvestment, overinvestment and disciplinary
benefits. Some stakeholder interests are served well with a larger proportion of long-term debt,
while other stakeholder interests are not served well with long-term debt. Therefore, long-term
debt may have a positive or negative association or no association with corporate social
performance as highlighted with a dotted line in Figure 1. There we propose the following null
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: There is no association between CSP and long-term debt.
3. Empirical framework and findings
The sample for this study consists of all Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed firms covered
in the Asset 4 ESG Database excluding the financial firms for the period 2004 to 2014. This sample
addresses sample-selection bias pointed out by Shahzad and Sharfman (2015) when only those
firms that engage in CSP are included. Financial firms are excluded because of their unique capital
structures and high degree of regulation.
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The final sample consists of the 236 non-financial firms (covering 1464 observations) listed on
the ASX with a valid CSP score. The sample comes from various sectors of the economy – basic
materials (36%), consumer cyclicals (15%), consumer non-cyclicals (6%), energy (17%),
healthcare (5%), industrials (15%), technology (2%), telecommunications (2%) and utilities (2%).
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the study. The firms in
the study are typically large with an average $4.6 billion (all dollar values refer to Australian
dollars) in total assets including tangible assets of $2.29 billion and cash and other equivalent
short-term assets of $0.36 billion. These firms have an average of $1.24 billion in total debt of
which $1 billion is long-term debt. The firms in the study have average revenue of $3.3 billion and
$0.45 billion of selling and general administrative expenses. These firms are typically profitable
with average earnings before interest, depreciation and amortization of $0.68 billion and with
estimated average franking credits due to tax imputation of $0.77 billion.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable
Total Assets
Long-term Debt
Total Debt
NPPE
Cash
Sales
SGA
EBITDA
Franking Credits
LevBVLT
LevBVST
LevBVTD
LevMVLT
LevMVST
LevMVTD
CSP
Growth
Size
RoA
Tangibility
Slack
Attainment Discrepancy
SGA to Sales
SD
Interest Rate Spread
WACC
Board Size
Board Independence
CEO Duality
Board Diversity
Board Attendance
Employee Ownership
Institutional Ownership

Observations
1455
1456
1456
1454
1455
1454
902
1429
1459
1456
1456
1456
1445
1449
1445
1464
1444
1455
1442
1454
1455
1435
897
1443
1397
1385
1351
1235
1352
1351
1331
1459
1459

Mean
4599.087
1062.157
1237.495
2286.037
362.549
3343.091
446.143
675.767
768.392
0.165
0.041
0.206
0.154
0.038
0.192
0.375
1.716
7.020
0.029
0.389
0.145
-0.037
0.026
0.237
0.003
0.108
7.036
0.603
0.052
0.457
0.960
0.032
0.095

Standard Deviation
13138.500
3146.472
3683.253
8394.877
1123.473
8794.722
1273.703
2758.457
3910.735
0.160
0.107
0.188
0.162
0.079
0.186
0.277
1.759
1.683
0.217
0.277
0.169
0.195
0.313
0.745
0.008
0.038
2.091
0.228
0.222
0.289
0.052
0.091
0.109
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LT Debt is long-term debt with maturity of more than one year. Total Debt is the total of long and
short-term debt. NPPE is computed as the net property, plant and equipment. Cash is the sum of
cash and short-term investments. Sales is the sales revenue. SGA represents expenses relating to
selling, general and administrative functions. EBITDA is the earnings of a company before interest
expense, income taxes and depreciation. These variables along with Total Assets are in millions of
Australian dollars.

Methodological approach
Given the censored nature of the value of proportion of debt (lies between 0 and 1), it is
inappropriate to use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Tobit models employing maximum
likelihood method yield consistent and unbiased estimates and therefore we employ them in a
panel setting. The panel models help address the issues of unobserved heterogeneity (Baltagi,
2008, Wooldridge, 2010). We use Stata 15 to examine the association between use of debt and
CSP. There are feasibility concerns about estimation of Tobit models with fixed effects and no
fixed effects Tobit model is available in Stata, given this, we employ panel Tobit random effects
model (StataCorp, 2017). Long-term debt, short-term and total debt are regressed separately on
CSP and a set of financial and governance variables identified in prior literature.
Dependent variable
Proportions of debt used is the main dependent variable employed in this study. To consider the
significance of long-term and short-term debt separately, measures are estimated separately for
both long-term debt and short-term debt. BVLT is long-term debt as a percentage of total assets
and is calculated on a book value basis. BVST is short-term debt as a percentage of total assets
and is calculated on a book value basis. BVTD is total debt expressed as a percentage of total
assets and is calculated on a book value basis. MVLT is long-term debt expressed as a percentage
of sum of total debt and market value of equity. MVST is short-term debt expressed as a percentage
of sum of total debt and market value of equity. MVTD is total debt expressed as a percentage of
sum of total debt and market value of equity.
Debt levels generally increased until 2008 and fell during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). PostGFC, debt on a book-value basis has remained in the range of 0.17 in 2011 to 0.20 in 2014 and
debt on a market-value basis increased over the same period from 0.12 in 2011 to 0.16 in 2014.
The sample firms employ approximately 20 percent of debt to fund their total assets, of which 80
percent is funded by long-term debt both on book and market value bases.
Explanatory and control variables
CSP is the variable of critical importance in this study and is based on the social performance score
from the Asset 4 ESG database. This measure is an indication of companies’ reputation and their
‘social license’ to operate. It captures the ‘trust and loyalty’ enjoyed by a company in its
relationships with employees, customers, suppliers and the community in general. It covers areas
such as community welfare and development (including all forms of diversity, equal opportunity,
and human rights), supplier relationships, health and safety (of customers and employees working
in value chain), product responsibility, and training and development of employees. The firms in
the study have an average CSP score of 0.37 with a minimum of 0.04 and a maximum of 0.98
(year-wise trends are available from authors on request). Their social performance increased from
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0.45 in 2004 to 0.53 in 2008. In 2009 and 2010 there was a considerable decline to 0.33 and 0.34
after which the average CSP remained in the range of 0.34 and 0.35.
We employ traditional financial determinants of debt as explanatory variables in this study.
Growth is calculated as a ratio of market value to book value. Size is calculated as the natural
logarithm of the total assets. RoA is the return on assets. Tangibility is calculated as a ratio of the
net property, plant and equipment to total assets. SGA to Sales is calculated as a ratio of selling
and general administrative expenses to sales. SD is the standard deviation of EBIT for the last 5
years. RD Dummy takes a value of 1 when R&D investments is reported and 0 otherwise.
Australia has a tax imputation system where by double taxation of corporate profits in the hands
of companies and shareholders is avoided. To account for possible effects of dividends on debt,
we employ franking credits accumulated by firms as a control variable. We estimate franking
credits based on the cumulative taxes paid and the franking credits distributed to domestic
shareholders. Information on financial variables was collected from the Worldscope database as
well as annual reports of the companies.
Apart from the traditional financial variables such as growth, size, profitability, tangibility and
taxes, other factors such as macroeconomic conditions and weighted average cost of capital
(WACC) may influence the proportion of debt used by firms. Changes in economic conditions
may also affect both short-term and long-term interest rates as well as the availability of slack
resources for firms to undertake investment in CSP activities. Without controlling for these factors,
it is difficult to isolate the influences of CSP on the use of debt. In this study we control for the
traditional financial variables as well as for interest rate spread and WACC following El Ghoul et
al. (2011), Ye and Zhang (2011). Interest rate spread is the difference in the yields of 10 year
Government Bonds and 180 Day Bills. We estimate the weighted average cost of capital (WACC)
based on estimates of cost of equity, cost of debt and proportions of debt and equity. Cost of equity
is estimated using capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Beta is estimated based on monthly returns
over a 5 year window. Cost of debt is estimated based on the average yields data collected from
the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA).
The sample firms had a WACC of 11 percent and the average term spread between long-term
interest rates and short-term interest rates is 0 with short-term interest rates being higher in some
and lower in other years.
Following previous literature, we also control for governance (Rees and Rodionova, 2015) and
ownership variables (Dam and Scholtens, 2012). Board size is the total number of directors on a
board. Board Independence is calculated as a ratio of number of independent board members to
total board members. CEO duality is a dummy variable that take a value of 1 when both the roles
of CEO and chairperson are performed by the same person, and 0 otherwise. Board diversity
captures the gender diversity of board members. Chairperson is ex CEO is a dummy variable and
takes a value of 1 when a chairperson is a former CEO, and 0 otherwise. Board attendance is the
proportion of board meetings attended by all board members. Employee ownership is the
proportion of ownership held by employees and directors. Institutional ownership is the proportion
of shareholding held by institutional investors.
The firms in the study period had on average 7 board members, with 60 percent being independent.
Attendance of the board members was high (96 percent) and only 4 percent of firms had the same
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person performing the dual roles of CEO and chairperson. In terms of ownership, employees held
3 percent and institutions 16 percent.
The relationship between CSP and use of debt is also not straightforward, for example, Arora and
Dharwadkar (2011) demonstrate “that the association between corporate governance and CSR
dimensions depends on differences in decision-making latitude originating from relative firm
performance compared to those of peer firms” (p. 136). Thus we include a variable attainment
discrepancy to control for relative performance compared to peers in the industry. Another
important factor – organizational slack – may also influence CSP and financing patterns. Shahzad
et al. (2016) find evidence of a negative relationship between financial slack and CSP for a sample
of US firms. Slack is calculated as a ratio of cash and short-term assets to total assets. Attainment
discrepancy is calculated as the difference between target profitability and profitability. Target
profitability is estimated as the median profitability within an industry.
The sample firms have an average growth (as measured by the ratio of market value to book value)
of 1.72, a slack of 0.14 and an attainment discrepancy of -0.04. In approximately two-thirds of the
sample firm-years dividends were paid and in about one-fifth of the firm-years losses were
incurred.
First correlations among the independent variables is considered for any possible multi-collinearity
related issues. Table 2 shows no unusually high values of correlations and therefore all variables
employed are considered appropriate.
Empirical findings on the association between CSP and debt usage
Table 3 presents the results of the analysis of the association between CSP and the use of debt
measured on a book value basis. BVLT is long-term debt as a percentage of total assets and is
calculated on a book value basis is employed as a dependent variable in Model 1. CSP has no
significant association with the proportion of long-term debt utilised by the firms in the study.
BVST is short-term debt as a percentage of total assets and is calculated on a book value basis is
employed as a dependent variable in Model 2. CSP shows a significant negative association with
the short-term debt of sample firms. BVTD is total debt expressed as a percentage of total assets
and is calculated on a book value basis. It is employed as a dependent variable in Model 3. CSP
has no significant association with total debt either.
Table 4 presents results relating to the influence of CSP on debt measured on a market value basis.
MVLT is long-term debt expressed as a percentage of sum of total debt and market value of equity
is employed as a dependent variable in Model 4. MVST is short-term debt expressed as a
percentage of sum of total debt and market value of equity is employed as a dependent variable in
Model 5. MVTD is total debt expressed as a percentage of sum of total debt and market value of
equity is employed as a dependent variable in Model 6.
CSP has a significant negative association with short-term debt while it has no association with
long-term and total debt.
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Table 2 Correlations
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

CSP

1.000

Growth

-0.113

1.000

Size

0.449

-0.269

1.000

RoA

0.129

0.058

0.243

1.000

Tangibility

0.066

-0.126

0.036

-0.116

1.000

Slack

-0.292

0.289

-0.473

-0.201

-0.159

1.000

AttDis

0.055

-0.060

0.115

0.458

0.002

-0.094

1.000

SGA

-0.060

0.023

-0.089

-0.098

-0.037

0.117

-0.037

1.000

Franking

0.482

-0.075

0.481

0.197

0.052

-0.281

0.098

-0.227

1.000

SD

0.298

-0.084

0.470

0.067

0.135

-0.083

0.024

-0.036

0.434

1.000

Rate Spread

-0.111

-0.038

-0.168

-0.079

0.035

0.072

0.026

-0.021

-0.120

-0.044

1.000

WACC

-0.287

0.169

-0.395

-0.101

0.070

0.378

-0.047

0.163

-0.342

-0.068

-0.079

1.000

Brd Size

0.408

-0.076

0.493

0.098

0.002

-0.298

0.033

-0.047

0.489

0.425

-0.160

-0.272

1.000

Brd Ind

0.365

-0.027

0.254

0.071

-0.049

-0.180

0.032

-0.064

0.209

0.097

-0.031

-0.236

0.042

1.000

Brd Div

0.388

-0.057

0.348

0.047

-0.145

-0.208

0.022

0.004

0.377

0.113

-0.067

-0.250

0.261

0.323

1.000

Brd Att

0.075

0.044

0.005

0.117

-0.134

0.023

0.069

-0.042

0.080

-0.052

-0.006

-0.038

-0.114

0.214

0.119

1.000

Institutional

-0.018

-0.011

0.012

0.075

-0.267

-0.082

0.049

-0.043

-0.039

-0.106

-0.063

-0.199

-0.026

0.162

0.144

0.029
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1.00

Employee
-0.129 0.032
-0.071 0.082
-0.078 0.021
-0.003 -0.015 -0.074 -0.042 -0.084 0.039
0.017
-0.268 -0.097 -0.006 -0.0
AttDis is Attainment discrepancy, SGA refers to SGA to sales, Franking is ln of Franking Credits, Rate Spread is Interest Rate Spread, Brd Size refers to Board Size, Brd Ind refers
Board Independence, Brd Div refers to Board Diversity, Brd Att refers to Board Attendance, Institutional is Institutional Ownership, and Employee is Employee Ownership.

Table 3 CSP and use of debt – Book value measures - Panel Tobit analysis Note: z statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
Model (1) - BVLT

Model (2) - BVST

Model (3) - BVTD

0.030

-0.041**

0.001

(1.14)

(-2.41)

(0.02)

0.012***

0.002

0.014***

(3.41)

(0.73)

(4.09)

0.037***

0.002

0.040***

(4.87)

(0.42)

(5.04)

-0.000

-0.001***

-0.001***

(-0.27)

(-7.31)

(-5.89)

0.057*

-0.046**

-0.031

(1.73)

(-2.37)

(-0.91)

-0.124***

0.002

-0.098**

(-2.99)

(0.07)

(-2.34)

0.081**

-0.057

0.030

(2.17)

(-1.07)

(0.84)

0.003

-0.003**

-0.000

(1.18)

(-1.98)

(-0.12)

-0.002

0.001

-0.003

(-0.46)

(0.39)

(-0.67)

-0.000**

0.000

-0.000

(-2.06)

(0.22)

(-1.47)

0.025

0.027***

0.058***

(1.62)

(2.87)

(3.68)

-1.094**

-0.235

-1.358***

(-2.41)

(-0.69)

(-3.10)

-0.735***

-0.332***

-1.076***

(-4.88)

(-3.46)

(-7.07)

-0.003

-0.001

-0.006

(-0.85)

(-0.42)

(-1.57)

-0.023

0.006

-0.001

(-0.85)

(0.34)

(-0.04)

0.019

0.000

0.012

(0.63)

(0.00)

(0.40)

0.011

-0.013

0.005

(0.56)

(-1.02)

(0.26)

0.017

0.018

0.038**

(0.89)

(1.43)

(2.00)

-0.062

0.107***

0.059

(-1.20)

(3.35)

(1.12)

0.036

0.006

0.051

(0.86)

(0.22)

(1.24)

0.052

0.026

0.070

(0.97)

(0.73)

(1.30)

-0.000

-0.009

-0.008

(-0.00)

(-0.82)

(-1.12)

Sector

Yes

Yes

Yes

Loglikelihood

587.247

781.726

587.327

χ2

546.627

219.955

651.393

Probability

0.000

0.000

0.000

CSP
Growth
Size
RoA
Tangibility
Slack
Attainment Discrepancy
SGA to Sales
Ln Franking Credits
SD
RD Dummy
Interest Rate Spread
WACC
Board Size
Board Independence
CEO Duality
Board Diversity
Chairman Ex CEO
Board Attendance
Institutional Ownership
Employee Ownership
Post GFC
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Table 4 CSP and use of debt – Market value measures - Panel Tobit analysis
Model (4) - MVLT
Model (5) - MVST
CSP
0.029
-0.042**
(1.17)
(-2.56)
Growth
-0.020***
-0.007***
(-6.06)
(-2.96)
Size
0.041***
0.005
(5.68)
(1.21)
RoA
-0.000
-0.001***
(-0.84)
(-5.76)
Tangibility
0.076**
-0.032*
(2.36)
(-1.72)
Slack
-0.048
-0.007
(-1.21)
(-0.26)
Attainment Discrepancy
0.042
-0.040
(1.18)
(-1.54)
SGA to Sales
0.004*
-0.001
(1.94)
(-0.87)
Ln Franking Credits
-0.002
0.001
(-0.56)
(0.35)
SD
-0.000**
0.000
(-1.98)
(0.12)
RD Dummy
0.004
0.017*
(0.30)
(1.80)
Interest Rate Spread
-1.143***
-0.039
(-2.68)
(-0.12)
WACC
-0.672***
-0.318***
(-4.72)
(-3.43)
Board Size
-0.010***
-0.004*
(-2.81)
(-1.86)
Board Independence
-0.037
-0.004
(-1.45)
(-0.26)
CEO Duality
0.041
-0.019
(1.41)
(-1.04)
Board Diversity
0.017
-0.000
(0.97)
(-0.01)
Chairman Ex CEO
-0.003
0.023*
(-0.18)
(1.94)
Board Attendance
-0.015
0.107***
(-0.30)
(3.44)
Institutional Ownership
-0.050
0.020
(-1.26)
(0.72)
Employee Ownership
0.009
0.012
(0.17)
(0.36)
Post GFC
0.009
0.001
(1.27)
(0.17)
Sector
Yes
Yes
Loglikelihood
621.256
823.025
193.507
χ2
481.994
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Model (6) - MVTD
-0.000
(-0.01)
-0.025***
(-7.42)
0.045***
(5.78)
-0.001***
(-4.60)
0.047
(1.37)
-0.030
(-0.69)
-0.001
(-0.03)
0.004
(1.46)
0.000
(0.03)
-0.000
(-1.44)
0.016
(1.01)
-1.210***
(-2.71)
-1.012***
(-6.59)
-0.017***
(-4.44)
-0.035
(-1.27)
0.022
(0.72)
0.025
(1.33)
0.016
(0.85)
0.092*
(1.73)
-0.019
(-0.45)
0.004
(0.08)
0.004
(0.55)
Yes
584.104
608.792
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Probability
0.000
0.000
0.000
Note: z statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.

Discussion of Findings
From the results presented above, it is clear that CSP has no significant association with the total
debt or the long-term debt of the firms in the study. These findings, on the surface, appear to
contradict the earlier findings of (Bae et al., 2011) who find that firms with better employee
treatment practices maintain lower levels of debt. However, given the similarities in the payoffs
to the primary stakeholders, CSP and long-term and total debt may not have any negative
association. These findings are also broadly consistent with CSR and cost of capital literature
(Sharfman and Fernando, 2008, El Ghoul et al., 2011, Ye and Zhang, 2011). Payoffs to short-term
lenders and other primary stakeholders differ considerably and firms’ reliance on short-term debt
may lead to additional agency problems particularly for those primary stakeholders who are not in
a position to influence the use of free cash flows. Therefore the hypothesis that CSP has a
significant negative association with short-term debt is confirmed. Firms that look after their
primary stakeholders reduce short-term debt levels as a way to provide assurance to these
stakeholders that value creation focuses on long-term assets and the funding of long-term assets is
undertaken through long-term sources rather than short-term sources.
Discussion of findings relating to other explanatory and control variables
The traditional financial, governance and ownership factors identified in previous literature are
included as controls for debt. These results are also presented in Tables 3 and 4 along with results
relating to possible associations between CSP and debt.
Consistent with previous studies, size has a significant positive association with total debt, and
long-term debt. Larger companies are likely to be well-diversified and therefore less likely to face
bankruptcy due to changes in economic conditions. Larger firms therefore employ more long-term
debt in their capital structure compared to smaller firms which are subject to a higher probability
of bankruptcy. This finding is consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure (Rajan and
Zingales, 1995, Frank and Goyal, 2009). Consistent with findings from previous studies, this study
finds that tangibility has a significant positive association with total long-term debt. The tangible
assets are available as collateral thus enhancing opportunities for borrowing (Rajan and Zingales,
1995). Higher tangibility may also imply lower default risk for lenders, thus making more debt
available to firms (Haque et al., 2011). Tangibility, on the other hand, has a negative association
with short-term debt, implying that firms with more collateral assets employ long-term debt rather
than short-term debt.
Growth has a varying association with debt depending on the way the latter is measured. Broadly,
when debt was measured on a book value basis, growth has a positive influence whereas for market
value measures of debt, growth has a negative influence. The findings relating to market value of
debt are similar to Qiu and La (2010) who find support for a negative relationship between debt
and growth for a sample of Australian firms. These findings are consistent with the view that
profitable firms may rely on retained earnings to fund future growth and therefore employ lower
levels of debt (Kayhan and Titman, 2007). Consistent with the trade-off theory, growth
opportunities imply higher risk and firms raise less debt to ‘avoid issues of debt overhang’ (Myers,
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1977). Dilution concerns may motivate firms to use debt rather than equity to fund growth
opportunities (Du and Dai, 2005).
This study finds that profitability has a significant negative association with the total debt as well
as short-term debt and thus supports the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). This
finding is also consistent with the finding of Titman and Wessels (1988), who find that profitable
firms have lower debt ratios.
The degree of financial slack, on the other hand, has a significant negative association with the
proportion of long-term debt as well as total debt employed. This is consistent with the notion that
firms that have a higher degree of financial flexibility may employ other sources of funding rather
than long-term debt.
Board attendance has a positive association with the level of short-term debt while it has no
association with long-term debt employed in the sample firms. The higher degree of monitoring
by board members through regular attendance at board meetings results in lower use of short-term
debt. Board size has a negative association with long-term and short-term debt measured on market
value basis, consistent with (Jo and Harjoto, 2011). None of the other governance or ownership
factors show any significant association with debt.

4. Conclusion
This study examines the influence of CSP on the total, long-term and short-term debt of a sample
of Australian firms for the period 2004 to 2014. The average CSP score increased from 0.45 in
2004 to 0.53 in 2008 and declined to 0.33 in 2009. It remained around this level in subsequent
years. Sample firms employed approximately 20 percent of debt to fund their total assets and
approximately four-fifths of total assets are funded by long-term debt both on book and market
value bases. Debt levels generally increased until 2008 and fell during the GFC. Post-GFC, debt
on a book-value (market value) basis has remained in the range of 0.17 (0.12) in 2011 to 0.20
(0.16) in 2014. The level of CSP shows no effect on long-term and total debt usage while it exerts
a significant negative association with the short-term debt usage of sample firms. All financial and
governance factors show influences that are consistent with previous studies. CSP has a significant
negative association with the short-term debt use of sample firms even after controlling for
financial, governance and ownership factors. This finding suggests that firms with employeefriendly policies reduce their short-term debt rather than long-term debt or total debt. Given the
similarities in the pay-offs of the primary stakeholders and the monitoring benefits provided by
long-term debt, firms that commit to the interests of primary stakeholders reduce the short-term
debt usage rather than long-term debt use.
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This study has implications for stakeholder theory, trade-off theory and pecking order theory.
While traditional financial variables included in this study show that the debt decisions of firms is
consistent with trade-off theory and pecking order theory, the negative effect of CSP highlights
the significance of stakeholder theory for capital structure choice. This latter finding is also
consistent with the conflict-resolution hypothesis.
This study has important insights for corporate executives, investors and CSR advocates as well
as policy makers concerned with corporate governance and stakeholder management and
protection. In addition to the amount of debt, the type of debt utilised has implications for primary
stakeholders. Corporate firms may reduce short-term debt in preference to long-term debt in order
to demonstrate their commitment to CSP activities. Similarly, investors and CSR advocates need
to consider the financial choices made by companies more thoroughly paying particular attention
to the structure of indebtedness. These findings could also inform the development and
implementation of appropriate voluntary and non-voluntary governance initiatives by policy
makers that facilitate enhanced CSP.
The focus of this study is the influence of CSP on the use of debt and not on the potential influence
of debt on CSP about which there is no consensus. Further research may explore this relationship
in more detail. Future studies may also directly quantify investments in CSP as well as possible
reductions in costs of doing business for corporate firms in addition to focusing on the relationships
between specific components of working capital and CSP.
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